Federated identity management systems for cyberinfrastructure: SAML vs. PKIX by Hayes, Thomas
 
 
 
 
 
FEDERATED IDENTITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS FOR CYBERINFRASTRUCTURE:  
SAML VS. PKIX 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY 
 
THOMAS CATT HAYES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THESIS 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of Master of Science in Computer Science 
in the Graduate College of the 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 2014 
 
 
 
Urbana, Illinois 
 
 
Advisers:  
 
Research Assistant Professor Rakesh Bobba 
Senior Research Scientist Jim Basney, National Center for Supercomputing Applications 
 
  
  ii 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
In scientific infrastructures researchers accessing computing and other resources (e.g., instruments, data) 
across institutional boundaries rely on federated identity management systems. Multiple competing 
technologies are in use for this purpose, including Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) and 
Public Key Infrastructure with X.509 Certificates (PKIX). These systems have found favor in different 
scientific computing communities but it is unclear what the difference in preference is based upon. In this 
study we discuss the security, usability, privacy and trust model assumptions of SAML and PKIX systems 
for researchers authenticating to grid computing systems across multiple domains. We provide a 
comparison of these systems to highlight where they provide equivalent functionality and where one 
technology is superior. 
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Introduction to Identity and Cyberinfrastructure 
Federated Identity 
Academic researchers seek technologies which ease the process of accessing computing resources and 
scientific data across institutional boundaries. Federated Identity Management (FIM)1 is one approach 
that allows users to maintain a single identity across different online domains. In this arrangement, 
research communities (e.g. a universities or laboratories) subscribe to a federation. Each user is given a 
single set of credentials and can then authenticate to the web services in other federation participants. 
This arrangement is also convenient for software applications on “the grid” that use computational 
resources from numerous institutions simultaneously. Research communities that join a federation make 
collaboration between subscribers more convenient and economical than having each user create a new 
set of “institution-specific” credentials each time they wish to share/use data and resources1. 
 
Scientists working at different research institutions need some additional infrastructure to establish trust 
over the Internet. For example, imagine an atmospheric scientist who has collected a large dataset of 
carbon dioxide levels and has stored it on her university’s grid computing resource. She has a peer at the 
neighboring university who specializes in plant biology and would like to use the measurements in a 
biosphere simulation. They have never met in person but wish to collaborate. Should the atmospheric 
scientist send the data directly? Often such data is large and cannot easily be transported over the 
Internet. Further, it can be controlled or sensitive data and thus not allowed to leave the network domain. 
Should a ‘one-off’ account and set of credentials be created for the plant biologist to authenticate to an 
institution he is not part of? These solutions are messy, expensive, and become confusing over the 
course of a career with many research collaborations. Extra infrastructure is required to securely send 
attributes about users to systems which can determine authentication rights to computing resources 
without burdening the user or the domains with undue credential management. 
 
Federated Identity is closely related to the concept of Single Sign On (SSO), which allows users to use 
multiple applications (for which he has authorization) from a service provider after signing in once. 
Authorization will persist for the length of a user session; the user will be logged out of all applications 
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from the service when the session is over. FIM systems can provide SSO services, but SSO and FIM are 
not identical. FIM can be likened to a passport recognized by a “federation” of nations. A nation issues the 
passport, which allows travelers to visit any other nation in the federation after the passport is checked at 
the border. SSO systems also issue tokens, but for our context they are only used within a single 
organization that provides multiple services. SSO can be likened to a wristband given by an employee at 
the door of a bar. If the ID shows the patron is over 21, he receives a wristband and does not have to 
“authenticate” with the bartenders anymore. He simply shows his wristband and is “authorized” to 
purchase drinks. SSO and FIM are important technologies that provide a convenient service to grid 
scientists. FIM enables a user access to multiple domains with a single account/credential. SSO enables 
a user access to multiple applications after authenticating once. 
   
Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML)2 and Public Key Infrastructure with X.509 Certificates 
(PKIX)3 are two competing technologies that facilitate federated authentication. Both technologies have 
found success in the grid computing community, but the rationale for choosing one technology for a 
certain environment is unclear. This thesis seeks to address and analyze the reasoning behind choosing 
SAML or PKIX to provide FIM in a grid computing environment. 
 
Historical Roots of Identity and Cyberinfrastructure 
The history of online identity management systems can provide insight into the problems that SAML and 
PKIX were designed to solve and the utility of these technologies today. Designing a Public Key 
Infrastructure (PKI) to distribute and manage secure stores of identity is a problem that was first publicly 
addressed by Diffie and Hellman in 19764. Even in the early days of ARPANET, the need for secure 
communication over insecure channels was apparent. Their ideas were reformulated in Loren 
Kohnfelder’s 1978 thesis “Towards a Practical Public Key Cryptosystem”, which introduced many of the 
concepts for certificates and revocation used in modern standards5. He proposed an active directory that 
people could use to browse and exchange digital certificates, which were generated offline. This vision 
was realized in 1988 when the International Telecommunication Union released the X.500 standards from 
its Telecommunications Standards Unit (ITU-T)6. The authors of these standards intended to create a 
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global “phone book” on the internet, which one could use to search for public keys based on the 
hierarchal structure and locations of the organizations people were affiliated with. For instance, finding a 
professor’s certificate to initiate secure communication would involve looking up his country, state or 
province, city, school, department, and finally, name. The standard introduced X.509 certificates and 
expanded on the general idea of PKI by enforcing a strict hierarchy for trusted key exchange via 
Certificate Authorities (CAs). Certificate Authorities were entities that would issue certificates to users or 
other CAs. The digital signature on the certificate would certify that the CA was a legitimate identity 
provider.. The system required users to trust the CA as an honest and competent manager of user 
identity, or trust another CA that certified that CA, creating the trust hierarchy that characterized PKIX. 
The entire X.500 series was a wide reaching specification of protocols, services, and models for a global 
directory of people and machines7. Although X.509 was the only standard of the X.500 series which 
became widely popular, X.500 inspired the creation of other technologies like Lightweight Directory 
Access Protocol (LDAP)8. LDAP offered directory services within a smaller scope than X.500, and was 
relatively successful9. To provide X.500 with historical context, note that the World Wide Web would be 
proposed by Tim Berners-Lee one year later in 198910. The web would soon create new avenues of 
communication and commerce, which would in turn pose their own unique security challenges. 
 
Around the same time, national interest in creating and connecting computational research institutions 
exploded, as the government sought to improve and expand the capabilities of the aging ARPANET. One 
measure taken to accomplish this was the creation of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), whose 
working groups promoted internet technology standards to “make the Internet work better”11. Perhaps the 
most high-profile instance of federal involvement in cyberinfrastructure was the High Performance 
Computing Act of 1991, which provided more funding for national research and education networks12. 
This funding culminated in Mosaic, an early browser that popularized the Web outside of academic and 
technical circles13. 
 
Many of the modern Internet’s predecessors were designed by these state-sponsored efforts to facilitate 
research between different universities and laboratories. One of the most significant predecessors was 
  4 
NSFNET. In 1983, Professor Larry Smarr authored an NSF proposal that led to the creation of five 
supercomputing centers across the United States14. NSFNET came online in 1986 to connect these 
centers over 56-kbit/s links, which were gradually upgraded and expanded. The network also provided 
connectivity to the surrounding cities and university campuses, establishing the framework for more 
general network applications15.  
 
The growing availability of the internet created new possibilities for scientific computing. In 1990, Smarr 
(now acting as the first director of the NCSA) suggested the concept of “metacomputing”16. He imagined 
an geographically sparse ecosystem of heterogeneous computer resources (databases, mainframes, 
graphics machines, etc.) being pooled over the internet to amplify the capabilities of applications. Similar 
to how today’s desktop computers seamlessly integrate memory, I/O, and processing units, 
metacomputers would integrate entire computing systems with little or no additional expertise required 
from the user. Smarr laid out three phases required to achieve this vision: (1) Engineer a general method 
to connect different computing elements that goes beyond previous “ad-hoc” approaches. (2) Create 
software applications to take advantage of this distributed environment by spreading workloads over 
different computing elements. (3) Expand the capabilities of internet infrastructure and standards to allow 
the transparent cooperation of numerous Local Area Networks (LANs) over a single national Wide Area 
Network (WAN). This proposal differed from previous applications of the internet to scientific computing, 
which were mostly based on simple remote access and data exchange. Metacomputing sought to 
achieve cooperation between computing systems on behalf of a single program and thus laid the 
foundation for grid computing, which would come to exist a few years later. 
 
Security features on the networks of the late-1980s were either added as an afterthought or totally 
absent. Logging onto NSFNET was as simple as issuing a TELNET command to specify the address of a 
machine from a remote terminal17. TELNET has provided this functionality since it was first developed in 
1969 as a nameless ad-hoc solution, and was standardized over the coming decade by various 
organizations18. Most early implementations did not offer encryption on the data being sent, nor any 
guarantee on the authenticity of remote hosts19. Two practical authentication technologies emerged to fill 
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this void, Kerberos20 and SPX21. Kerberos was an open source system from MIT which saw wide 
adoption following its invention in the late-1980s and standardization in 1993. SPX was a proprietary 
solution from Data Equipment Corporation (DEC) that was also standardized in 1993, but did not achieve 
the same level of popularity. While Kerberos depended on Authentication Servers (which were expected 
to be co-located with the service providers), SPX was based on the recent X.500 standards which 
mandated a hierarchal network of remote CAs. The authors of SPX lamented the unavailability of CA 
infrastructure at the time necessary to correctly implement X.500 services, and this may have contributed 
to its relative lack of success.  
 
X.509 certificates would find their “killer app” with the invention of the Secure Socket Layer (SSL) by 
Netscape in 199422. Through a combination of public key cryptography and symmetric cryptography built 
on top of X.509, SSL provided the means by which users and websites could establish secure sessions. 
SSL’s success with mainstream web users may be attributed to its nearly effortless usability. Contrary to 
other cryptographic technologies like PGP23, a user never had to handle keys or certificates directly. After 
a user navigated to a website, the site presented the browser with a certificate issued from a CA. The 
browser comes installed with a bundle of certificates to compare signatures with, and only accepts 
certificates from CAs it considers trustworthy. The security company RSA recognized the value of this 
arrangement in 1995, and set up the company VeriSign to act as “the” certificate authority24. The 
commercial certificate authority would set up the necessary public key infrastructure and then sell X.509 
certificates to websites that browsers would trust. VeriSign (presently owned by Symantec Inc.25) would 
eventually become the most successful certificate authority on the web, certifying the largest share of 
commercial websites26. New companies were created (Comodo27, GlobalSign28, and Go Daddy29) to 
follow this model, and within a few years, selling trust became big business. 
 
Back in the public sector, scientists across the United States organized a year long experiment to 
demonstrate the capabilities of a “wide area supercomputer”. The “Information Wide-Area-Year” or “I-
WAY” project ended in 1995 and showed the power of linking over a dozen supercomputing centers 
without constructing additional network infrastructure30. It was considered “the first nationwide 
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infrastructure to support collaborative computational science projects on a large scale”, and highlighted 
the potential issues that distributed computing must address in the future in order to continue evolving31. 
Following this effort, an influential book titled "The Grid: Blueprint for a New Computing Infrastructure” 
was published in 1998, pushing the evolution of grid technologies beyond the original concept of 
metacomputing32. The two authors of “The Grid” also provided their own killer app: the Globus Toolkit33. 
Globus was built on technical elements from the original I-WAY experiment. It provided the low level 
networking required to connect systems as well as the high level services that computational scientists 
could use to build their own distributed applications. The original paper addressed concerns regarding 
authentication by proposing the use of certificates issued by a central authority provided by Globus. The 
exact means of authentication was left as general as possible to account for a diverse distributed 
computing environment. The intention was that a range of machines with different authentication 
mechanisms (SSL/TLS, Kerberos, etc.) could be utilized by a single distributed application built on 
Globus. 
 
As scientists in the late-1990s and early-2000s realized applications had greater utility when shared 
across institutional boundaries, the benefits of providing FIM features became more apparent34. The 
networking landscape of this period was also favorable to the creation of Single Sign On (SSO) 
technologies, as accounts for online user applications began to accumulate. SSO would allow users to 
use all of the applications offered by a service provider for the duration of a browser session after signing 
in once. This is one of the security services offered by SAML implementations. The SAML standard 
emerged from the OASIS consortium in 2001 as a means for exchanging security policy information2. The 
current version (SAML 2.0), was created out of a partnership between the authors of Shibboleth and the 
Liberty Alliance, and later approved as a standard by OASIS. SAML 2.0 addressed a need for standard 
Federated Identity Management (FIM) software in an environment of multiple similar incompatible 
protocols. 
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SAML and PKIX Systems Today 
Modern implementations of the standards are popular in different grid computing communities. Presently, 
the International Grid Trust Federation (IGTF) manages federated identities using X.509 certificates 
issued by 103 CAs in over 50 countries35. The InCommon Federation includes 333 IdPs36. We will 
describe the technologies and standards to provide insight to the capabilities and limitations of SAML and 
PKIX. 
 
Description of SAML 
 
SAML uses XML, HTTP, and SOAP technologies to exchange 
authorization and authentication data (called SAML assertions) 
between entities. The components needed to establish trust between 
a user and a new institution is shown in Figure 1. In our ‘neighboring 
universities’ example from the introduction, the researchers could 
solve their problem by having their institution subscribe to a 
federation, like InCommon36. This kind of arrangement allows users to authenticate to the resources of 
other institutions in the federation. The institutions must all be approved and trust the Federation Operator 
(FedOp) to only federate trustworthy subscribers. Most subscribers in InCommon are large research 
institutions like universities and national laboratories. 
 
Each one of the subscribing institutions needs to set up an online piece of software (typically Shibboleth) 
to manage the identities of users and mediate authentication requests to a computing resource operated 
by the institution. The Identity Provider (IdP) keeps track of everyone’s identity, while the Service Provider 
(SP) is the gateway to the computing resource the user seeks. 
 
The flow of a successful user authentication37 is as follows: An unauthenticated user navigates to an SP 
operating a service he wishes to utilize. The SP then has to decide which IdP is appropriate and which 
protocols to use. Once an IdP is found, the user is sent to the “Single Sign On Service” of the IdP. The 
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IdP chooses an authentication mechanism that is appropriate for the attributes it was given. These 
attributes are packaged into an assertion format the SP can use to make the final authentication decision. 
The IdP uses it’s signing key to sign the assertion and then uses the SP’s encryption key to make the 
message private. The user’s browser then redirects this assertion back to the SP, which decrypts and 
verifies it, and then checks that the attributes are appropriate for authorization on the desired resource. If 
so, a session is initiated for the user, and the user may begin utilizing the SP.  
 
SAML requires all of these interactions to be signed, and the signing keys must be verified by the 
FedOp’s signing key. These keys sign SAML metadata, which are the basis of trust in the SAML world. 
SAML metadata describes who each entity should consider trustworthy, and which IdPs and SPs a user 
should be directed to. The components must all be trusted by the FedOp and must always be online. 
 
Description of PKIX 
PKIX is a product of an Internet Engineering Task Force working group for using X.509 certificates issued 
by a trusted third party (a CA) to bind public keys with user identities on the web3. PKIX can accomplish 
the same goals as SAML, but using X.509 certificates instead of SAML assertions. The nature of PKIX is 
more independent and offline. The components are similar to SAML, but there is no strict requirement on 
who is allowed to participate or who a user interacts with.  
 
In our neighboring universities example, imagine the administrators have moved from SAML to PKIX on 
their grid computing resource. What would change? Users would no longer be part of their old federation; 
they would have to find a new one that depended purely on certificates, not on metadata and assertions. 
X.509 certificates can relate all the same information about user attributes between entities as assertions, 
and can be signed and encrypted by trusted authorities for confidentiality and integrity. PKIX should allow 
a user to use the same username and password to manage certificates which will help them authenticate 
at various institutions that are trusted. Who determines who is trusted, now that we have discarded our 
FedOp?  
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The concept of a Certification Authority or CA is central to PKIX. The CA 
issues certificates that bind a public key to entity attributes. A CA would 
issue our plant biologist a certificate to present to the grid computing 
resource. In PKIX, the entity that provides a service that users wish to 
authenticate to is referred to as the Relying Party (RP). The grid 
computing resource can then use the attributes in the certificate to decide 
whether the user the user is authorized.. CAs, RPs and users can 
subscribe to a different type of federation that uses PKIX, like IGTF (International Grid Trust Federation). 
In this type of arrangement, a Root CA is the anchor of trust, or the entity that must be trusted by nothing 
else but its authority. The Root CA certifies the identities of CAs and RPs for federated institutions. 
 
Each CA runs software (e.g., OpenSSL) to manage the identities of users and other CAs. The CA keeps 
track of the end user’s identity in an offline fashion, meaning a CA is not involved in every authentication 
request. The CA issues certificates for the user to validate his identity, and the RP is the gateway to the 
computing resource the user seeks access to. 
 
A Root CA issues a certificate to a CA to denote trust in that entity to manage identities in the federation. 
A certificate is also issued to the RP so grid computing resources can be certified as having a certain 
identity. The user presents his certificate from the CA to the RP, allowing the RP to make authorization 
decisions without further involvement from the CA. 
 
Equivalent Components 
The criteria by which an institution should prefer one technology is unclear because SAML and PKIX are 
very similar systems. The previous sections showed that SAML and PKIX rely on analogous entities 
which exchange data to establish trust and implement security policy. Figure 3 represents a simplified 
view of the relationships between the components in both standards and will be explained below.  
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Figure 3. A generalized model of a federation in the SAML and PKIX standards 
 
Node A in the graph represents an entity which is ultimately responsible for deciding who is trustworthy. 
SAML calls A the Federation Operator (FedOp). The analogous structure in PKIX is the root Certification 
Authority (CA) or CA certifier. The FedOp and the root CA are trusted by virtue of their authority and their 
ability to keep their private keys secret. A’s role in both systems is to use its private key to sign the public 
key of B.  
 
Node B registers and maintains a user’s identity in the federation. SAML refers to this as the Identity 
Provider (IdP). PKIX uses a subordinate CA certified by A (PKIX depends on a hierarchical web of CAs). 
This CA signs and issues certificates to the user D in PKIX. The IdP issues assertions in SAML. In either 
case, B uses its private key to sign data related to the identity of the end entity or user. 
 
Node C is the Service Provider (SP) in SAML and the Relying Party (RP) in PKIX. This entity is the 
resource that users seek access to, such as a database or a high performance computer. A user 
authenticates to C by obtaining a certificate or assertion from B, which is trusted by C. 
 
Node D is the user in both models. The user authenticates to C which then decides whether D can use 
the service. Once again, signed certificates determine which users are trusted in PKIX. In SAML, users 
  11 
authenticate with a password to the IdP, and then send assertions signed by the IdP to the SP to use the 
service.  
 
Differences in Technologies 
There are a number of variations from this simplified, generalized model in the standards and in practice, 
which highlight the important differences between the technologies for users. There are two levels of trust 
decisions made by C in both models, (T1) C’s decision to trust A to properly identify B and (T2) C’s 
decision to trust B to properly identify D. 
 
Level (T1) is how the authority in a federation indicates that it trusts entities to manage users’ identities. 
SAML uses the Explicit Key Trust model38 here, where public keys inside certificates are the means of 
trust, rather than the certificates themselves. The certificate is simply a wrapper for a public key. SAML 
metadata is the information that binds this key to an entity’s identity. In contrast PKIX uses the PKIX Trust 
Model38, in which the entire X.509 certificate for the subordinate CA is trusted. There is more information 
in these certificates as its role in PKIX is to bind an entity’s identity to a public key and not just deliver the 
key itself. 
 
Level (T2) is how the identity managing entity indicates its trust in the user. SAML exchanges information 
about security policy at this level with SAML assertions, statements about the user’s identity that are 
typically bound to a bearer credential (such as a password). PKIX uses X.509 end-entity certificates to 
bind identity information to their RSA private key, a holder-of-key credential. 
 
Level (T1) trust determines trust at Level (T2). Information (as certificates or metadata) from A enables C 
to validate assertions signed by B. 
 
Another difference is in the way keys are handled and how important each one is to the integrity of the 
system. At the top level, A’s key signs B’s public key. SAML’s FedOP publishes metadata that other 
entities use to verify their signing keys in interactions below the FedOp level. It uses the metadata signing 
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key to do this. Even though the FedOp is not directly involved in interactions between other entities, lower 
entities depend on this information when establishing trust with each other. Root CAs issuing certificates 
to subordinate CAs capture this relationship in PKIX. Having a key compromised at this topmost level 
would be the most severe security breach, as the integrity of the entire system would be vulnerable until A 
published new keys by some secure out-of-band process39. 
 
B uses its key to make a statement about users’ identities and the legitimacy of their attributes. SAML’s 
IdP verifies FedOp signed metadata with the public key of the SP, and uses its own signing key to sign 
assertions about the user. SAML’s metadata refreshes daily, so once notified of a security breach, a user 
would wait for any incorrect assertions to expire and then update their password. PKIX’s subordinate CA 
uses its key to sign an end entity certificate and issue it to the user. A PKIX user must wait for a browser 
update to get new CA certificates. If B’s signing key is compromised, an adversary can issue bogus 
assertions/certificates. 
 
In both SAML and PKIX, C has its own X.509 certificate that it uses to authenticate to the user, to assure 
that the user is connecting to the correct service. SAML’s SP decrypts the assertion to read its contents 
and verifies the IdP’s signature on the assertion to ensure its authenticity. This is how the SP determines 
who is requesting access. PKIX accomplishes this by using identity information contained in the 
certificate. If C’s decryption key is compromised, an adversary can read (but not modify) the content of 
B’s assertions. 
 
The least damaging situation is if a single user has their key compromised. The PKIX standard calls for 
the user to contact their CA which adds the serial number of the associated certificate to a Certificate 
Revocation List (CRL). SAML has no revocation procedure. Typically, SAML metadata is refreshed 
periodically (for example, every day in InCommon), so if B’s private key is compromised, C will not be 
notified until the next periodic refresh. 
 
Nodes A and B in our general model are rarely single entities in either model. Single-root or anchor CAs 
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are uncommon in PKIX, and their organization more often has less hierarchical arrangement. The IGTF 
maintains a distribution of many root CA certificates, no more than a few per country. Web browsers 
bundle many CAs together in the “bag of CAs” model40. Bridge CAs are another arrangement, in which 
two root CAs can choose to trust each other and sign certificates for each others’ subordinate CAs41. The 
relationship a user has to the entity providing identity also differs in practice. The IdP is often a user’s 
employer, while exchanging certificates with a CA typically means interacting with an external company. 
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Security Issues 
User Credentials 
Handling credentials properly is imperative to the security of any system. SAML and PKIX handle this 
issue differently in the amount of responsibility the user is trusted with. A user must manage their own 
cryptographic keys in PKIX by copying them onto whatever machine they use and then keep them 
secure. This key is typically valid for one year if the user’s machine is not compromised. SAML’s most 
successful use-cases function at the web browser level. A user needs only a username and password to 
authenticate to the resources of any member of their federation. Both systems require the user to secure 
a long-lived credential (either a password or private key), but PKIX’s private key typically exists as a file 
on the system. This file means the PKIX user must remain on the machine the key is located or copy the 
key to another machine. SAML users can log on from any web browser. 
 
These systems could also be contrasted by their passivity in light of a password compromise. An IdP has 
more opportunities to detect a compromise than a CA. For instance, an attacker attempting to guess the 
password must send all of their failed attempts to the IdP, who can see this information directly and 
freeze the account temporarily for suspicious activity. A CA’s relationship with a user is more laissez-faire. 
A certificate is issued once a year for the user to log in with, and the user is on their own to report a 
possible compromise. 
 
Malicious Actors 
Man In The Middle (MITM) attacks are a concern when components must communicate with the 
possibility of messages being intercepted. Signed, encrypted data provides protection from this threat in 
both systems. In theory, someone with malicious intent could attack either system more directly by 
advertising themselves as a legitimate component. Every SP is vetted with the FedOp in the SAML world. 
Hundreds of universities and laboratories comprise the SAML network of federations and thus a 
‘malicious actor’ would have to either impersonate a representative from a legitimate and well-known 
organization or convince the FedOp to trust an unknown institution. In PKIX, CAs verify ownership of a 
DNS name before issuing server certificates with that name. Once B issues a certificate to D, D can 
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authenticate to any RP without B’s approval. In SAML, B is involved in every authentication and will issue 
assertions only to SPs that it trusts (via metadata and local policy). 
 
The topmost entity A could also go rogue and set up an illegitimate identity provider B. Users trust the 
head of the federation fully, so an attack at this level would have the most far-reaching consequences. A 
rogue node B could spoof everyone in the organization out of their credentials. Both systems provide a 
measure of protection against this called namespace control, which ensures that credentials are issued 
only to bearers with the correct namespace attribute. The feature is part of the SAML standard, but often 
not used in the PKIX world. SAML’s small community would also make a rogue node B more obvious in 
this case as well. Every interaction needs to be approved as legitimate by SAML’s metadata, providing an 
extra layer of protection. 
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Privacy and Trust 
Users of authentication software have a reasonable expectation that their personal information will be 
kept private. Any reputable distributed system that handles user credentials should meet this requirement. 
SAML and PKIX require users to trust a third party with their identity, since they do not trust the service 
provider directly. This is a fundamental weakness in both protocols. Every trusted party represents a risk 
to the user and a smaller assurance that their identity is secure. A rogue CA or IdP has the potential to 
violate user privacy or even act maliciously on user’s behalf. Examining the nature of trust in both 
systems can provide insight into the practical assurances they offer for a user’s privacy. 
 
SAML IdPs have a close relationship with the user, as they are often based out of the same organization. 
As such, details of a user’s activity on an SP may be immediately accessible to their employer, because 
the IdP is involved in every transaction. Research Institutions like NCSA can and do set up their own CA 
to achieve the same level of familiarity with their employees. This use case reduces the chance of leaking 
sensitive information from third parties, but outside of the grid computing community this arrangement is 
uncommon. In the mainstream PKIX world, the relationship between a user and a CA is distant and often 
handled “behind the scenes” by the browser. A CA issues a certificate for the user once a year without 
any knowledge of how or where it will be used. However the CA may still be privy to private information. 
CRL’s can grow quickly, so to alleviate the cost of managing a large list across a network, relying parties 
can send OCSP requests if they want to check if a certificate is valid43. These requests are problematic 
because they are unencrypted and can reveal information about the way a user interacts with relying 
parties, such as the certificates they requested and the time they were used.  
 
PKIX has corrected this privacy issue with a technique known as OCSP stapling44. Stapling pushes the 
responsibility of checking for revocation on the party holding the certificates. A user polls the CA in short 
intervals. The CA responds with a message indicating the validity of the certificate, signed and time-
stamped. The certificate holder appends this message onto the certificate.. The service verifies the 
signature and the timestamp to ensure the message is authentic and freshly generated, without disclosing 
the certificates they are curious about to the CA. OCSP stapling is beginning to be adopted by browsers 
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and was included in the OpenSSL library as of version 0.9.8g45. 
 
Does SAML offer or need a similar protection? There are no certificates to revoke, and SAML assertions 
are short lived. However, assertions are still not protected from their own IdP. Assertions are signed for 
authenticity and sent over an SSL connection, but the manager of an IdP can still read the attributes once 
they arrive. Since an IdP is often run by the user’s employer, one would expect the attributes in the 
assertion to be information the employer already knows. For a grid scientist, this includes attributes like 
name, job title, and project role. In the context of grid computing, this information is more sensitive outside 
of the scientist’s place of employment, because these details may not be public information. The privacy 
risk is mitigated in SAML because this information is locally managed; the employer does not have to 
trust an external company with attributes about their employees or their online behavior at work. Contrast 
this with the fact that in PKIX, the trusted third party is an external company. If the PKIX employer does 
not use OCSP stapling, and the CA is not run locally, they must release of information about their 
employees to outside companies. 
 
Both protocols in their most common implementation must release information about their employment to 
an identity manager. The privacy risk is greater for PKIX because this data is more sensitive outside of 
the company. This risk may be mitigated if OCSP stapling becomes a popular technology in the context of 
grid computing software or running local CAs becomes more popular outside of grid computing. Presently 
it is less risky for SAML users to trust their identity provider because of the nature of the attributes 
contained in assertions. 
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Assurance and Trust 
The assurance guarantees offered by the protocols depend on the ecosystem in which they exist. They 
are built on provably secure technologies like public key cryptography and cryptographic signatures, but 
practical implementation issues and exploits of unstated assumptions in the protocols may erode a user’s 
confidence in any technology. 
 
When the CA is not local, PKIX provides assurance in the form of an external company (like Verisign) that 
the user must trust. A user’s browser is responsible for knowing which CAs to consider legitimate. The 
hierarchal nature of PKIX means that a browser will accept a certificate from a CA that has a certificate 
from more well-known CA the browser trusts by default. The assurance this setup provides is bolstered 
by the assumption that the cost of obtaining a certificate most browsers will accept is too high or difficult 
for any malicious parties. The user’s trust in PKIX is therefore contingent the following conditions: (P1) the 
browser trusts the CA directly or through a chain of certificates leading to a trusted CA, (P2) the user will 
refuse to trust certificate chains that lead to unrecognized CAs, (P3) the cost of becoming a trusted CA or 
obtaining a certificate from a trusted CA is too high for attackers, (P4) the certificates cannot be forged or 
intercepted, (P5) the certificate checking mechanism is difficult to bypass. 
 
Conditions (P1) is built into the protocol and handled by the browser: if it encounters a certificate from a 
legitimate CA, it will check the signature and create a secure connection without user intervention. If the 
browser is presented with an unknown certificate, it often provides a conspicuous warning to the user. 
Condition (P2) pushes trust onto the user to be computer security savvy and vigilant to the threat of a 
Man In The Middle (MITM) attack. The security of the protocol depends on users always rejecting bad 
certificates, but still gives them the choice not to. As a matter of convenience some users will accept bad 
certificates, making them vulnerable to attack. Even though this can be considered the user’s fault, the 
protocol made this possible by allowing bad certificates to be accepted. The availability of certificates on 
black markets has deflated confidence that certificate authorities are established, trustworthy entities, 
removing confidence in (P3)46. (P4) has been put into question by a number of vulnerabilities in the 
OpenSSL library, including the high-profile “heartbleed” bug47. Tools like SSLStrip and SSLSniff have 
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deflated assurance in (P5)48. The inability to assume four out of the five conditions that trusting a CA 
requires ((P2),(P3),(P4), and (P5)) erodes assurance that the technology is secure. 
 
SAML has a flatter, more close knit arrangement of components, which provides more assurance that 
users can trust their Identity Provider. Instead of a chain of CAs, users trust an IdP in their Federation, 
which is trusted by a single Federation Operator. User’s trust in their IdP depends on the following 
conditions: (S1) the browser trusts the IdP directly or through the FedOp (S2) assertions can not be 
forged, (S3) the assertion checking mechanism is difficult to bypass. 
 
Condition (S1) is easy to satisfy because of the different relationship a SAML users usually have with 
their federation. The network of IdPs and SPs are either the user’s own employer or a recognizable 
laboratory or university. Eroding user assurance by breaking this condition would involve a complex and 
long term social engineering attack, which has yet to be demonstrated. Attaching cryptographic 
signatures to assertions provides authenticity that gives confidence in condition (S2) being satisfied. 
Furthermore, SAML provides attributes for valid time ranges and requires SSL encryption to protect 
against replay attacks49. As for the assertion checking mechanism being difficult to bypass (S3), to the 
best of our knowledge, no sidestepping mechanism (similar to SSLstrip) has been created to execute a 
MITM attack. However, a privacy attack on the XML Encryption standard has been demonstrated in a 
Shibboleth Security Advisory51. Because SAML libraries depend on XML Encryption, there is a chance 
that assertions could be exposed. Aside from this, the signatures, replay protection mechanisms, and use 
of SSL all provide assurance that IdPs are genuine. 
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Usability and Trust 
The more control users have over their identity, the more assurance they have that it will not be 
compromised. Greater control also requires more work and technical expertise for the user. The tradeoff 
between control and usability highlights a difference in trust between authentication systems. A system 
that requires the user to notify a third party when their certificate is revoked pushes trust on people to be 
responsible and vigilant with their identity, and the user is an active participant in this process. If the third 
party updates credentials without this type of notification, trust is pushed on the system to handle user 
information, and the user is alleviated of revocation duty. 
 
PGP (Pretty Good Privacy) is an email encryption system that uses PKI without X.50923. PGP’s PKI 
contrasts with PKIX in that it is not hierarchal. Users still have to manage keys, but do so in a “web of 
trust” where trust depends on personal connections, not trusted third party authorities. It is a successful 
email encryption package, but its relative difficulties with usability has led to limited adoption. Certainly 
there is demand for encrypted communication, but secure technologies that place a technical burden on 
the user have trouble attaining mainstream success50. Users are responsible for learning the basics of 
public key cryptography and certificates, generating and exchanging keys, and revoking them when they 
suspect a compromise. For the grid computing use case, the situation is similar. Although they have the 
most control over their credentials in this situation, the security “chores” they are responsible for can be 
pushed onto the system without losing trust that the system is secure. 
 
A number of practical issues arise when implementing and using these technologies. Learning the 
libraries associated with either standard (Shibboleth or OpenSSL) creates an imposing barrier, so existing 
software is often used for new federations. Maintaining and administering an IdP or CA is also difficult. 
Both require a server to verify identities and have high availability. The CA has the added challenge of 
issuing CRLs, handling revocation, and maintaining certification status. The IdP must additionally 
maintain the policies of the SP in an online fashion, because in contrast to a CA, it is involved with every 
interaction with the SP. 
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Scalability is also a concern when choosing a new technology. If IGTF wanted to federate more 
organizations, it would need more CAs. There is typically one CA per country, responsible for issuing 
certificates once per year. The CRLs can grow quite large, making it difficult to scale the servers that run 
CAs. Since in the SAML model each organization is usually its own IdP, it is easy to add more 
organizations to a federation. However, since the IdP must be involved in every transaction, the metadata 
could become difficult to process as it can become large in large federations. 
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Conclusion 
The environments that created SAML and X.509 were quite different. X.509 was one facet of a grand 
vision for a global directory service that was never fully realized. The committee that designed the 
standard were optimistic in imagining that internet citizens would be willing to disclose the structure of 
their organizations, and their own personal information. They overestimated the reliability of certificate 
authorities and created large trust networks dependent on relatively few points of failure. They failed to 
provide a convenient means for users to manage their own certificates outside of the browser. OCSP 
stapling corrected the problem of inefficient certificate revocation lists and inappropriate disclosures to the 
CA, but this feature is still struggling to find mainstream adoption, and has its own security issues. X.500 
was a vague and overreaching standard whose design predates the World Wide Web. It is inappropriate 
for the grid authentication problems of today, having been designed without any data on how mainstream 
users interact with the Internet. As network technologies looked to solve the authentication problems of 
the 1990s, developers repeatedly turned to X.509 certificates because they were mature technology 
capable of storing identity attributes. The problems of trusting third parties persisted, and were only 
multiplied by the growing complexity of certificate chains and bridge CAs. Because of these issues, the 
infrastructure required for X.509 to be easily usable and interoperable with a range of certificates never 
fully developed as the Internet became more popular.  
 
In contrast, SAML was designed to solve a smaller scope of authentication and authorization problems. 
With over a decade of experience with the way users experience the web, SAML’s success can in part be 
attributed to a more clearly defined problem for a better understood security ecosystem. SSO for many 
sites was similar to signing in to any other web service.  
 
The comparative analysis has showed the two models are quite similar. They provide the same features 
of authenticating users from a set of organizations to a set of services, and the components they use to 
accomplish this are analogous.  
 
SAML has a better mechanism for handling user credentials. A SAML user only needs a username and 
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password. Keeping an X.509 certificate on your machine is a necessity for PKIX, and means the user 
must now worry about the security of this file, and only log on to his federation using machines that have 
a copy of it. The SAML user’s credentials allow him to be more mobile with identity and more secure. 
 
The relative success of SAML in the grid computing domain may be related to its increased usability. 
Users are only responsible for a username and password. SAML technologies do not burden the users 
with managing their own certificates or keys. If they suspect their credentials have been compromised, 
they simply create a new password, similar to any other online account. Given two technologies with 
similar structure and security assurances, users will prefer the one which is more user friendly for their 
applications. 
 
SAML gains an extra layer of protection from the close-knit nature of the community. The relatively small 
number of organizations on top of the requirement that IdPs be approved by the FedOp make the SAML 
world a small one, and consequently any malicious agents are more apparent. The IdP is involved in 
every interaction. The downside of this closeness is that users hand control over to the federation and 
must trust the IdP (often their employer) with personal information. In the future, systems that protect the 
privacy of SAML users could be developed and examined. In the specific context of grid computing, the 
privacy risk is relatively lower for SAML. SAML systems keep the details of a grid scientist within the 
organization, because the IdP is run by the scientist’s employer. This employee’s work is the business of 
his employer and is private to the organization, not the employee. PKIX requires trusting an external 
company with internal grid science information, which may be damaging if released outside of the 
organization. 
 
The direction of grid computing is a determinant of the success of either technology. Scientists are 
making a shift from the command line to the browser, using sites like nanohub.org to access computing 
tools. Historically the domain of PKIX has been server certificates and not user certificates. It is common 
to have users authenticate directly with a website and only interact with a CA to check a CRL. SAML is 
primarily a browser based technology as well, and its success in the future depends on its ability to adapt 
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to the changing needs and concerns of the web. SAML took advantage of the changing atmosphere that 
created it to provide a service people would find easy to use. PKIX was born out of a time when relatively 
few users were comfortable with using Internet services. It did not adapt well to the changing 
requirements of the web, and only grew more complex and as the years passed. The grid technologies of 
the future should favor new technologies designed for the needs of their time, and dismiss mature 
technologies which have lost their relevance and usability. 
 
To summarize, the usability provided by SAML is greater because a user does not need to manage their 
own certificates, and only needs a username and password. SAML provides greater assurance through 
the online nature of its relationship with user authentications. With responsible and vigilant users, both 
protocols offer a similar degree of security. As for privacy, different use cases of SAML and PKIX can 
result in varying degrees of user confidentiality. 
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